Declaring an Emergency

Reprinted from the UK Flight Safety Committee’s Focus on Commercial Aviation Safety, Autumn 1999 Issue, with permission. Although nearly identical to Canadian procedures, the following information reflects procedures in the UK. For the specific Canadian application, read your A.I.P. section COM 5.10.

There has always been a reluctance by many pilots to declare an emergency, in spite of the clear advice to do so if the situation warrants. This attitude may have filtered down from the airlines who shun what they see as adverse (and increasingly sensational) publicity when, for example, a "local-standby phase" is declared by ATC. In other cases, pilots can be reluctant to "make a fuss", displaying perhaps a macho attitude in believing they can handle the situation. The thought of having to go through a reporting procedure may also deter some.

When something goes wrong, sometimes our pilot mindset can be such that we believe circumstances do not warrant any outside assistance. A light twin-engine aircraft, for example, is certificated for single-engine performance, and in an engine failure situation it is often hoped that flight can be sustained without incident. However, this and any other type of emergency or reduced performance situation (such as icing) should be advised to ATC so that they understand your predicament and can plan assistance accordingly.

Failure to clearly state the nature of a problem not only prevents ATC from providing assistance, but also (in the worst case) may deprive accident investigators of any leads to explain what led to the burnt-out wreck before them. Remember that there are two levels of communication, distress and urgency.

Distress is defined as being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and requiring immediate assistance (use MAYDAY, pronounced three times in Canada).

Urgency is defined as a condition concerning the safety of an aircraft, or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance (use PAN, pronounced three times in Canada).

The urgency situation is probably the one which is not advised as often as it should be. If you declare an urgency situation, it is possible that the problem may be resolved (or alleviated) before it becomes a distress situation. If the problem is resolved or a safe landing made, don’t forget to cancel the MAYDAY or PAN.

Flight Planning

Dead Editor,

I am a flight service specialist working at the London Flight Service Station (FSS) and I would like to submit a solution to a problem that, I'm sure, affects all FSSs. When an aircraft is overdue on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan/itinerary, one of the first steps FSS must take is to check the destination airport. At remote airports, and/or at night, this can be a fairly complex undertaking that often involves sending the police to the airport in question.

To minimize this problem, pilots should include a contact phone number that is most likely to allow FSS to reach them directly in their flight plan or itinerary. This could be a home phone number of the friends/relatives visited, the hotel where they will be staying, or even a cell phone. This would allow us to establish more quickly the pilots’ whereabouts, and the search could be terminated before more drastic search and rescue (SAR) actions are taken.

Rob Elford
FSS London

Lesson Learned from Tragedy

by Bruce MacKinnon, Wildlife Control Specialist, Aerodrome Safety, Transport Canada

In the business of risk management, we frequently discuss abstract concepts such as active failures, latent conditions, causal effects as well as links in the chain of events that contribute to an accident. On July 15, 1996, a Belgian Air Force C-130 Hercules crashed at Eindhoven Air Base in the Netherlands, resulting in 34 fatalities and 7 serious injuries. The tragic circumstances surrounding this accident provide a poignant message that dramatically shifts abstract concepts into gut-wrenching reality.

The Hercules departed Melsbroek, Belgium, for Eindhoven Air Base via Villafranca and Rimini in Italy. On board were 37 passengers and 4 crew members. Of the 37 passengers, 36 were armed forces musicians who had given several performances in Italy. It was during the flight from Italy to Eindhoven that a chain of events began that, when examined carefully, can provide a valuable lesson.

The Hercules arrived ahead of schedule at Eindhoven, and was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 04. The airport bird control officer had previously been asked to report to the tower when it was assumed that the Hercules would arrive later in the day, although normal procedure required him to be on the field monitoring bird activity during flight operations. These circumstances required the bird control officer and air traffic control (ATC) staff to fire pyrotechnics from the tower to disperse a flock of birds that was observed shortly before the Hercules was due to land. The bird control officer and ATC staff failed to detect that a large, mixed flock of lapwings and starlings was sitting near the runway in grass, which had recently been mowed but had not been raked.

Just prior to touchdown, approximately 500 to 600 of these small birds were observed by the flight crew, who elected to carry out a missed approach. During the overshoot, the No. 1 and No. 2 engines were severely damaged by bird ingestion. The crew also feathered the No. 3 engine, likely believing that this engine was also damaged. With only the No. 4 engine producing power, the aircraft yawed approximately 70 degrees to the left, banked approximately 35 degrees to the left, lost altitude and crashed into the ground. The fuel tanks ruptured and flames engulfed the aircraft.

While the aircraft was still airborne, ATC staff activated the crash alarm, and emergency response staff reacted immediately. A misunderstanding during the initial calls resulted in the assumption that only the flight crew was on board the aircraft, with the result that backup fire fighters did not respond. A further assumption that the flight crew could not have survived the fire led to the decision not to enter the severely damaged aircraft (see photo). Because of these assumptions, more than 25 min were lost in the rescue effort. Meanwhile, survivors were unable to evacuate the aircraft because the doors had been damaged in the crash. Survivors were evacuated to the local hospitals 40 min after the accident.

It appears from the available information that quite a few links in the chain of events could have been broken to prevent this accident. For instance, the bird control officer could have been sent back to the field prior to ATC giving a landing clearance to the aircraft. Aircraft arriving early or departing late are common to any operation and the short delay that would result from the bird control officer returning to the field would have been a minor one.

Freshly mowed grass that is left unraked near a runway is an inviting site for birds. Had the mowed grass been properly disposed of, the probability of having a large flock of birds resting there would have been reduced, and it may also have offered a better view of the birds from the tower. Had more effective communications taken place during the initial calls, especially regarding the number of people on board, the fire fighters would have responded accordingly and possibly reduced the number of casualties.

Finally, the initiation of a missed approach in such a situation is something to reflect on seriously, and perhaps this issue could be discussed among pilot groups. We have received a number of reports describing incidents in Canada where pilots initiate an overshoot once they see birds in the runway environment, often resulting in aircraft control problems. Harm to turbine engines involved in bird-strike incidents is greater when the engines are operating at high power settings.

Although we fully realize that the critical decision to either overshoot or continue with the landing rests with the aircraft captain, bird-strike reports suggest that it may be advisable to continue with an assured landing, instead of applying full power and flying through a "cloud" of birds.

Perhaps the Eindhoven tragedy may have been prevented had one link in the chain of events been broken. The fact that the Dutch military has a state-of-the-art bird control program proves that if such an accident can happen there, it can happen anywhere.